Theories of international relations Essays

Theories of international relations Essays Theories of international relations Essay Theories of international relations Essay A structural query in the social sciences and associated areas as we know it today has deep roots in the history of Western thought. To find out the fundamental, constitutive, structures into which the sensory data of human observation and experience fall: this was a fundamental objective of the ancient Greeks, to go back no far in time (S. Sambursky, 1956). The Greek root of word idea refers to pattern, relationship, or constitution. When we speak of Platos doctrine of Ideas, we might better speak of his principle of Forms, for this is specifically what they were. Granted that these were ideal, even heavenly units in Platos philosophy, it relics true, as Cornford has stressed, that Plato was also a cosmologist, keenly interested in the nature of the actual, experiential world, social as well as physical.   In Platos cosmology there is a thoughtful sense of reality as comprised by not discrete data but shapes and forms mathematical in character (F. M. Cornfo rd, 1952). Nor where Platos student and absconder Aristotle has any less interested in structures. As all interpreters of Aristotle have stressed, it is the living being, and with it growth, that dominates Aristotles mind as the basic model of structure. Organismic structure is, indeed, one of the oldest and most determined models to be found in Western philosophy and science. From Aristotles day to our own, with barely any lapses, the philosophy of an organism has been a significant one: sometimes with stress on the more static aspects, as in anatomy, but other times on the dynamic elements which are found to be constitutive, as in physiological processes, with growth. Structuralism can be inert in character, or it can be hereditary and dynamic. Contending purely organism model of structure have been as a minimum two others: the mathematical and the mechanical. Most likely the first is at least as old as the organismic. The earliest, pre-Socratic Pythagorean School of philosophy sought to reveal that reality is mathematical- that is, formed by irreducible geometrical patterns. As, the Pythagorean philosophy exercised great influence upon Plato, and much of his own cosmology contains efforts to refine the Pythagorean view of the geometric structures which form the real. The notion that reality is eventually mathematical in character is of course a very powerful one at the present time. A basic notion is interest in the relationships, the connections, within which we discover primitive elements of matter and energy. The perfunctory conception of structure, though also very old, enjoyed a renascence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the consequence in substantial degree of the influence on all thought of such physical philosophers as Kepler, Galileo, and Newton. It was nearly expected, given the great repute of these and other minds engaged in the search for laws, systems, and structures in the physical world, that the type of systems and structures they set forth in astronomy, physics, and mechanics must have excited the interests of those concerned mainly with man and society. To see society as a great machine with prototypes of equilibrium, action and reaction, and association of parts to the whole was alluring indeed, as so numerous of the ventures in social physics or social mechanics in the eighteenth century make evident. As with biology and the replica of the organism, mechanics and its model of the machine offered both statics and dynamics. Structuralism in sociology and associated disciplines has a long history insofar as its fundamental grounds are concerned. As Raymond Williams has written: We need to know this history if we are to understand the important and difficult development of structural and later structuralist as defining terms in the human sciences.( Raymond Williams, 1956). There are numerous major, and diverse, outsets of structure to be found in the social sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but at the extraction of all of them lie in one relation or other the biological, mathematical, and mechanical models of reality which have wield strong effect upon so many areas of knowledge over the past numerous millennia in the West. Challenges of Structuralism Through the decline of student movements by the early seventies, the slipping and incorporation and commercialization of broader counter-cultural propensities, the appearance of an international economic crisis, and the rise of Thatcherism and Reaganism, the cultural theories and the politics of the critical theory that inclined the New Left were called deeply into question. For several especially in Britain and France, Althussers theory of cultural apparatuses, joint with semiotic theories of discourse, and his overall project of a scientific, structuralist Marxism, appeared the apparent alternative to the failures of humanist Marxism, especially the Hegelian Marxism of the Frankfurt tradition. More usually, a rediscovery of the political economic practicalities of Marxism was called for in opposition to the unrealistic and romantic humanism of critical theory. The challenge of structuralism (and its commencement of social reproduction and related semiotic theories of discourse) pro ved critical for the revision and rethinking of the cultural theory of critical theory in the seventies. Of decisive significance here was a reassessment of the tasks of critical theory as a form of empirical research, as well as a rethinking of the nature of the association between culture, the state and social movements. The job of surveying the response of critical theory to structuralism and structuralist semiotics is intricate by the difficulties of differentiating the composite of tendencies symbolized by structuralism and post structuralism, as well as the arbitrariness of separating off cultural analysis from other concerns of critical theory. There is a certain difficulty in separating out the reaction of critical theory to structuralism as opposed posting structuralism; given that they share numerous assumptions and that their reception took place more or less concurrently for many of those with access to the original French texts. The main justification for such a separation, beyond the significant theoretical shifts entailed, is that the focus of structuralism theories of society is the imitation of culture, whereas the focus of poststructuralist theories is in part the impracticality, or as a minimum difficulty, of any positive, representational theory of culture in the former sense. Gidde ns provide a practical characterization of these underlying continuities. Poststructuralist authors, such as Derrida and Foucault, were reacting against aspects of structuralism thought and yet were obliged to many of its varied assumptions and arguments such as the work of de Saussure, Là ©vi-Strauss, Althusser, Lacan, and early Barthes). Though handled distinctively in structuralism and post-structuralist writing, a number of shared themes can be identified: †¦the thesis that linguistics, or more accurately, certain aspects of particular versions of linguistics, are of key importance to philosophy and social theory as a whole; an emphasis on the relational nature of totalities, connected with the thesis of the arbitrary character of the sign, together with a stress upon the primacy of signifiers over what is signified; the decentring of the subject; a peculiar concern with the nature of writing, and therefore with textual materials; and an interest in the character of a temporality as somehow constitutively involved with the nature of objects and events. There is not a single one of these themes which does not bear upon issues of importance to social theory today. Equally, however, there is not one in respect of which the views of any of the writers listed above could be said to be acceptable. (Giddens, 1987:196) The precise boundaries of the theory of culture are also notoriously difficult to define. Some focus on More narrowly an artistic notion of culture, others slip into a more generic and inclusive one. As Nelson and Grossberg note in their recent collection: †¦cultural theory is now as likely to study political categories (such as democracy), forms of political practice (such as alliances), and structures of domination (including otherness) and experience (such as subjectification) as it is to study art, history, philosophy, science, ethics, communicative codes or technology. Cultural theory is involved with reexamining the concepts of class, social identity, class struggles, and revolution; it is committed to studying questions of pleasure, space, and time; it aims to understand the fabric of social experience and everyday life, even the foundations of the production and organization of power itself. Consequently, it is all but impossible to define the terrain of cultural theory by pointing to a finite set of object-domains or to the search for a limited set of interpretive tools. (1988:6) Cultural phenomena of Structuralism Structuralism contains and combines numerous elements of a classical epistemological dichotomy between quintessence and appearance in terms of the continuum between depth and surface. Là ©vi-Strauss, who were mainly instrumental in exercising this geological metaphor, liken the configuration of cultural phenomena to their layering as in strata, and the considerate of such phenomena in terms of the excavation of these stratums and an exposure of their patterns of interrelation. Elements of a culture, are the surface manifestations or demonstrations of underlying patterns at a deeper level equally within time, the ‘synchronic’, and through time, the ‘diachronic’. What de Saussure has provided, and what stands as perhaps the most momentous and binding element of all structuralism, is that the fundamental pattern or structure of any cultural phenomenon is to be understood in terms of a linguistic allegory. The lexical terms or items of vocabulary within such a language are offered by the symbols that subsist within social life, that is, the representations that attach to or arise from the substantial state of things or materiality itself. The grammatical rules of this metaphoric language are offered by the act, the continuous and habitual act, of significance. So the diversities of ways that we make sense in different cultures variously articulates and therefore gives rise to the diverse ‘languages’ that our cultural symbols comprise. The involvedness of this system of meaning is compounded by the fundamentally arbitrary relation between any particular object and state of affairs and the symbolic (linguistic) device that is engaged to indicate its being. Thing likeness, then, as objective and recognizable within any culture, derives not from any association between names and named but from a precisely poised structuring of otherness in our restricted network of ideas. Thin gs are not so much what they are but appear from a knowledge of what they are not, indeed a system of oppositions; the principle at the core of any binary code. Now the tenderness of this structuring of otherness remains secure, certainly, it appears as vigorous through the very practice of sociality, through the perseverance and reproduction of that tenancy relation at each and every turn within a culture. Meaning, then, within a particular culture, emerges from convention overcoming the random relation between the signifier and the signified. Convention replicates culture, and culture is conditional upon reproduction within structuralism. Bourdieu is devoted to the development of a critical yet indebted theory of culture and as such his ideas provide a significant contribution to our understanding of both power and power within our society. He began from an analysis of the education system and the part that its institutions play in the formation and diffusion of what counts as legal knowledge and forms of communication: †¦the cultural field is transformed by successive restructurations rather than by radical revolutions, with certain themes being brought to the fore while others are set to one side without being completely eliminated, so that continuity of communication between intellectual generations remains possible. In all cases, however, the patterns informing the thought of a given period can be fully understood only by reference to the school system, which is alone capable of establishing them and developing them, through practice, as the habits of thought common to a whole generation. (P. Bourdieu, 1971, p. 190) It is here that he divulges elements of a Durkheimian epistemology through his interest in the supporting character of cultural representations, the production and continuation of a social consensus that is a concept parallel in significance to the idea of a Collective consciousness’, and through the supposition of the social origins and perseverance of knowledge classifications. He is, though, critical of what he sees as Durkheim’s positivism in that it depends upon a stasis, and also that Durkheim believes the functions of the education system to be expected (J. Kennett, 1973). A major contribution of Bourdieu’s thought has been his improvement of a series of influential metaphors to eloquent the subtle relation of power and dominion at work in the social world and through the stratification of culture. Most notable is that which he draws from political economy when he speaks of cultural capital: ‘†¦there is, diffused within a social space a cultural capital, transmitted by inheritance and invested in order to be cultivated.’ (P. Bourdieu, 1971, p. 192) Stratified socialization practices and the system of education function to distinguish positively supportive of those members of society who, by virtue of their location within the class system, are the ‘natural’ inheritors of cultural capital. This is no crude conspiracy theory of a cognizant manipulation, somewhat what is being explored here is the prospect of a cultural process that is self-sustaining and self-perpetuating. This process is observed as carrying with it a framework of anticipation and tolerance of stratification and privilege. In this way Bourdieu moves from the ideological function of culture into a wakefulness of the weird efficacy of culture in that it is seen as structuring the system of social relations by its execution. Therefore, as Bourdieu makes clear, even within a democratic society this demonstration of disguised machinery continues to reinstate the inequalities of a social order which is pre-democratic in character and anti-democratic in essence. Structuralism in modern society The culturalist custom shares with the Marxist at least two major theoretical suppositions: first, the investigative postulate of a necessary, and quite elemental, disagreement between cultural value on the one hand, and the developmental logic of utilitarian capitalist civilization on the other; and secondly, the regulatory imperative to locate some social institution, or social grouping, adequately powerful as to protract the former against the latter. Culturalist hopes have been variously invested in the state, the church, the mythical intelligentsia and the labor movement; Marxist objectives in theory much more consistently in the working class, but in practice also in the state, as for communist Marxism, and in the intelligentsia (and very often more particularly the literary intelligentsia) for Western Marxism. Structuralism accepts neither analytical postulate nor regulatory imperative. For the former, it substitutes a dichotomy between manifestation and essence, in which esse nce is revealed only in structure; for the latter, a scientistic epistemology which characteristically denies both the need for dictatorial practice and the prospect of meaningful group action. There are numerous diverse versions of structuralism, of course, both in wide-ranging and as applied to literature and culture in particular. But, for our purposes, and very broadly, structuralism might well be distinct as an approach to the study of human culture, centered on the search for restraining patterns, or structures, which claims that individual phenomena have connotations only by virtue of their relation to other phenomenon as elements within a systematic structure. More particularly, certain kinds of structuralism those denoted very often by the terms semiology and semiotics can be recognized with the much more particular claim that the methods of structural linguistics can be effectively generalized so as to apply to all features of human culture. Structuralism secured entry into British academic life initially during the late sixties and seventies. But in France and structuralism has been a devastating Francophone affair it has a much longer history. The basic continuity between structuralism and post-structuralism is, nevertheless, not so much logical as sociological. Where Marxism desired to mobilize the working class, and culturalism at its most thriving at any rate, the intelligentsia, against the logics of capitalist industrialization, both structuralism and post-structuralism donate to a very different, and much more modest, intellect of the intellectual’s proper political function. In an observation truly directed at Sartre, but which could just as easily be intended toward Leavis, Foucault writes thus: For a long period, the†¦intellectual spoke and was acknowledged the right of speaking in the capacity of master of truth and justice†¦ To be an intellectual meant something like being the consciousness/conscience of us all some years have passed since the intellectual was called upon to play this role. A new mode of the â€Å"connection between theory and practice† has been established. Intellectuals have got used to working, not in the modality of the â€Å"universal†, the â€Å"exemplary†, the â€Å"just-and-true-for-all†, but within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them†¦ This is what I would call the â€Å"specific† intellectual as opposed to the â€Å"universal† intellectual (Foucault, 1978). Anti-historicism is a much more characteristic defining feature of structuralism. Both Marxism and culturalism translate their aversion to utilitarian capitalist civilization into historicity persistence that this type of civilization is only one amongst many, so as to be capable thereby to raise either the past or an ideal future against the present. By contrast, structuralism characteristically inhabits a never-ending theoretical present. The only significant exception to this observation is Durkheim, whose enduring evolutionist we have already noted. But so structuralism is his commencement both of primitive â€Å"mechanical solidarity† and of compound â€Å"organic solidarity,† that Durkheim cannot in fact account for the shift from the one to the other, accept by a badly masked resort to the demographic fact of population growth, which necessitates, on his own definition, a theoretically illicit appeal to the non-social, in this case, the biological (Durkheim, 1964 ). So structuralism is Durkheim’s basic preoccupation that this account of the dynamics of modernization becomes, effectively, theoretically incoherent, an allegation that could be leveled at neither Marx nor Weber, Eliot nor Leavis. And after Durkheim, even this residual evolutionism disappears from structuralism. Conclusion Structuralism’s anti-historicism directs it to take as given whatever present it might choose to study, in a fashion quite alien both to culturalism and to non-Althusserian Marxism. This positively makes possibly a non-adversarial posture in comparison with contemporary civilization; it does not, however, require it. A stress on structures as deeper levels of realism, inundated beneath, but nonetheless shaping, the realm of the empirically obvious, can very easily permit for a politics of de mystification, in which the structuralism analyst is understood as piercing through to some furtively hidden truth. For so long as this hidden reality is seen as somehow confusing the truth claims of the more apparent realities, then for so long can such a stance remain attuned with an adversarial intellectual politics. Even then all that eventuates is noticeably enfeebled, and fundamentally academic, versions of intellectual extremism, in which the world is not so much changed, as conside red differently. And again, while structuralism is certainly attuned with such radicalism, it does not need it. Hence the rather peculiar way in which the major French structuralism thinkers have proved capable to shift their political opinions, usually from left to right, without any corresponding amendment to their particular theoretical positions. For structuralism, as neither for culturalism nor for Marxism, the nexus between politics and theory appears irreversibly contingent. This permutation of positivism and what we might well term â€Å"synchronism† with an obligation to the demystification of experiential reality propels the whole structuralism enterprise in a fundamentally theoretic direction. A science of the stasis, marked from birth by an inveterate anti-empiricism, becomes almost inevitably preoccupied with highly abstract theoretical, or formal, models. Hence the near ubiquity of the binary resistance as a typical structuralism trope. Theoretical anti-humanism arises from fundamentally the same source: if neither change nor process nor even the finicky empirical instances are matters of real concern, then the intentions or actions of human subjects, whether individual or collective, can simply be disposed of as extraneous to the structural properties of systems. In this way, structuralism infamously â€Å"decentres† the subject.